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Abstract
We analyze a new panel data set that includes balance sheet information,
measures of expected default risk, and credit spreads on publicly-traded debt
for more than 900 ﬁrms over the period 1997Q1 through 2003Q3. We obtain
precise time-speciﬁc estimates of the ﬁnancial frictions parameter underlying
the benchmark ﬁnancial accelerator model of Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist
(1999) and clearly reject the null hypothesis of no credit market imperfections;
furthermore, for the expansionary period through mid-2000, these estimates are
quite similar to the calibrated values used in previous research. Finally, we ﬁnd
that ﬁnancial market frictions exhibit strong cyclical pattern, with parameter
estimates rising by a factor of two during the latest economic downturn before
returning to pre-recession levels in 2003.
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In a world ` a la Modigliani and Miller (1958) with no ﬁnancial market imperfections,
the capital structure of ﬁrms is indeterminate and the aggregate mix of debt versus
equity is irrelevant for the evolution of the real economy. Models of economic ﬂuctu-
ations such as IS-LM, real business cycle models, and the canonical new-Keynesian
model have relied upon this theorem to justify their abstraction from ﬁnancing deci-
sions.
Nevertheless, since Fisher’s (1933) explanation of the Great Depression1, economists
have recognised that ﬁnancial factors can play a crucial role in the ampliﬁcation and
propagation of macroeconomic shocks and in the transmission of monetary policy. As
shown in Figure 1, the spread between Baa and Aaa corporate yields—an indicator
of the deterioration of ﬁnancial conditions—widened during most of the NBER-dated
recessions since the 1920s. Although this could simply reﬂect higher expected de-
fault costs, it seems unlikely that these costs alone can account for the sharp rise in
the spread—given actual defaul rates for Aaa and Baa bonds.
Starting with the seminal work of Bernanke and Gertler (1989), ﬁnancial market
imperfections have been formalized in micro-founded models to explore the role of
ﬁnancial factors during economic downturns.2 There is, however, a lack of consensus
on the quantitative signiﬁcance of these frictions for business cycle ﬂuctuations. In
the context of dynamic general equilibrium models, ﬁnancial market frictions have
been evaluated solely using calibrated values of the agency cost parameters. The
empirical literature, instead, has investigated the extent to which ﬁnancial balance
sheet variables inﬂuence investment, production, and employment decisions of ﬁrms.
Though not without controversy, the general ﬁnding is that the real decisions of ﬁrms
that are most likely to be facing severe informational problems in credit markets
1Fisher (1933) argued that the deterioration of borrowers’ balance sheets stemming from “debt
deﬂation” contributed importantly to the severity and persistence of the Great Depression. More re-
cent work on that era by Bernanke (2000) and Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2004) has identiﬁed
a host of other ﬁnancial factors that reinforced the contraction phase of the early 1930s.
2Informational asymmetries between borrowers and lenders have been introduced under various
guises into general equilibrium models by Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997), Kiyotaki and Moore (1997),
Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999), and Cooley, Marimon, and Quadrini (2004). Implications
of ﬁnancial market frictions for the transmission of monetary policy are discussed by Bernanke and
Gertler (1995). Following the 1997 Asian ﬁnancial crisis, a number of economists started considering
implications of credit market imperfections in open-economy settings; see, for example, Krugman
(1999), Aghion, Bacchetta, and Banerjee (2000), Cespedes, Chang, and Velasco (2000), Caballero
and Krishnamurthy (2000), and Gertler, Gilchrist, and Natalucci (2003).
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Figure 1: Spread between Baa and Aaa Corporate Yields
Note. Shaded vertical bars denote NBER−dated recessions.
are excessively sensitive to movements in balance sheet variables like cash ﬂow and
net worth.3 These results, although generally consistent with the existence of credit
market imperfections, do not provide direct evidence of the magnitude of agency
costs, leaving the question of the empirical relevance of ﬁnancial market imperfections
generally unanswered.
In this paper, we use a new ﬁrm-level dataset to quantify the magnitude of ﬁnan-
cial market fricions. Our panel includes more than 900 large ﬁrms over the period
1997Q1 through 2003Q3 and covers a signiﬁcant portion of the nonfarm nonﬁnancial
corporate sector. The novel feature of our dataset is that it links balance sheet in-
formation to credit spreads on publicly-traded corporate debt and to market-based
3This approach has been motivated by the failure of the Q-model of investment to account
adequately for ﬁrm-level investment dynamics, a result often attributed to the misspeciﬁcation
caused by the eﬀects of credit market imperfections. The empirical strategy typically relies on an
a priori chosen proxy for the severity of informational problems in credit markets (e.g., ﬁrm size, the
presence of bond rating, etc.) to classify ﬁrms into “credit constrained” and “credit unconstrained”
groups. Under the null hypothesis of no credit market frictions, cash ﬂow and other balance sheet
variables should not have a diﬀerential eﬀect on investment spending of the two sets of ﬁrms; see
Hubbard (1998) for a comprehensive of review of this literature. An alternative interpretation of the
role of cash ﬂow in investment equations that does not rely on credit market frictions is provided by
Kaplan and Zingales (1997) and Cummins, Hassett, and Oliner (1999).
2measures of expected default risk. Using non-linear least squares, we estimate the
structural parameters of the contracting problem between lender and entrepreneur of
the benchmark ﬁnancial accelerator model of Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999)
(BGG hereafter).
We obtain precise time-speciﬁc estimates of the bankruptcy cost parameter, which
enable us to clearly reject the null hypothesis of frictionless ﬁnancial markets. Fur-
thermore, for the expansionary period through mid-2000 our estimates are quite sim-
ilar to the calibrated values used in previous research. We also ﬁnd that the degree
of ﬁnancial market frictions exhibits strong cyclicality. The parameter estimate of
bankruptcy costs, in fact, increases by a factor of two during the latest economic
downturn before returning to pre-recession levels in early 2003. Finally, we show that
the model-implied (unobservable) external ﬁnance premium was close to zero until
the end of 1999 but rose sharply afterwards, providing an important explanation for
the sharp drop in capital spending during the latest economic contraction.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 speciﬁes the microe-
conomic debt-contracting framework and examines its comparative statics. Section 3
provides an overview of the data, while Section 4 describes the estimation methodol-
ogy. Section 5 presents the empirical results, and Section 6 concludes.
32 The Theoretical Framework
In an inﬂuential recent paper, BGG embed the costly-state veriﬁcation (CSV) debt
contracting problem of Townsend (1979) and Gale and Hellwig (1985) into a dynamic
stochastic general equilibrium model with money and sticky prices. In the CSV
framework, there are “bad” states of the world in which it is optimal for a ﬁrm to
default on its debt obligations. Agency costs arise because limited liability creates
an incentive for a ﬁrm to default in “good” states. To ascertain whether the true
state of the world warrants default, a lender has to pay a cost. Because borrowers
have insuﬃcient wealth with which to ﬁnance their investment projects, a lender will,
in equilibrium, demand an external ﬁnance premium (cost of external funds less the
opportunity cost of internal funds) in order to be compensated for this veriﬁcation
cost.
In general equilibrium, the CSV framework gives rise to a ﬁnancial accelerator.
The key factor in the ampliﬁcation mechanism is the negative relationship between
the leverage of borrowers (the ratio of debt to net worth) and the external ﬁnance
premium. Reﬂecting shocks to return to capital and to ex post real borrowing costs,
net worth moves procyclically, causing countercyclical swings in the external ﬁnance
premium. Because of these endogenous ﬂuctuations in net worth, movements in the
external ﬁnance premium are highly persistent, and ﬂuctuations of macroeconomic
variables are magniﬁed and propagated through the economy. In the remainder of this
section, we present the formal details of the debt contracting problem and examine
its comparative statics.
2.1 The Debt Contracting Problem
At the end of period t − 1, an entrepreneur who manages ﬁrm i purchases (homo-
geneous) capital to be used in production during period t. Ex ante, the revenue
expected from the investment project is given by Rk
tQt−1Kit,w h e r eKit is the quan-
tity of capital that the entrepreneur purchases at unit price Qt−1 (measured at the
end of period t − 1 relative to the price of the ﬁnal good), and Rk
t is the aggregate
gross rate of return on capital investment.4
4Following the BGG convention, the time subscript on capital denotes the period in which the
capital is actually used. We assume that when making the investment decision, the entrepreneur
takes Qt−1 and Rk
t as given. In general equilibrium, of course, both the price and the return on
capital are endogenous.
4Realized revenue in period t is given by ωitRk
tQt−1Kit,w h e r eωit ∈ R+ is an i.i.d.
(across ﬁrms and time) productivity disturbance with the probability density function
f(ω)a n dE[ωit] = 1 for all t. Because the entrepreneur has insuﬃcient net worth
to ﬁnance the entire capital investment, he must obtain a loan from a risk-neutral
ﬁnancial intermediary. Letting Nit−1 denote the entrepreneur’s net worth at the end
of period t − 1, he borrows Bit−1 to purchase the requisite amount of capital:
Bit−1 + Nit−1 = Qt−1Kit.







it is the contractual gross interest rate paid on the loan amount Bit−1.
To fund loans, the intermediary raises funds at the risk-free gross interest rate
Rt ≤ Rk
t. If the lender had complete information about the idiosyncratic shock
ωit, arbitrage would ensure that in equilibrium Rk
t = Rt. The lender, however, can
only observe ωit by paying a “monitoring cost,” assumed to be proportional to the
realized revenue from the project. In particular, if the borrower claims an adverse
productivity shock and defaults on his debt obligations, the lender, after verifying




where 0 <µ<1 measures costs associated with bankruptcy proceedings.5
The presence of bankruptcy costs and asymmetric information about the ﬁrm-
speciﬁc productivity shock creates an incentive for the entrepreneur to claim default
in situations when the realized productivity is high. Reﬂecting these agency prob-
lems, the incentive-compatible debt contract between the lender and entrepreneur
stipulates a productivity threshold such that if the realized productivity is above the
threshold, the borrower repays the loan and keeps the remainder of the revenue from
the project. If, however, the realized productivity falls below the speciﬁed thresh-
5As argued by Smith and Str¨ omberg (2003), the main purpose of corporate bankruptcy law is to
mitigate bargaining frictions when a ﬁrm is in ﬁnancial distress. These frictions necessarily entail
costs to the lender that include, but are not limited to, the veriﬁcation of assets and liabilities, the
protection of assets during bargaining among claimants, and costs of liquidating the ﬁrm’s assets.
5old, the entrepreneur will be faced with negative proﬁts and will declare bankruptcy,
leaving the proceeds of the project—net of bankruptcy costs—to the lender.



















Thus, under the incentive-compatible debt contract, the entrepreneur’s expected
proﬁt will be given by ψ(ωit)Rk




(ωit − ωit)f(ω)dω. (2)
Note that if ωit < ωit, the entrepreneur declares bankruptcy and simply walks away
from the project with nothing. The expected return to the lender under such a
contract can be expressed as ξ(ωit;µ)Rk








In equilibrium, therefore, the optimal debt contract negotiated at the end of period
t − 1 speciﬁes the amount Bit−1 that the entrepreneur can borrow along with the
default productivity threshold ωit, so as to maximize the expected return of the











6See BGG for additional technical details that guarantee a solution without credit rationing and
that ensure entrepreneur’s participation in the project. We checked our numerical results to make
sure that they are consistent with all the assumptions of the BGG framework.














Given the aggregate rate of return on capital Rk
t and the risk-free rate Rt,e q u a -
tion 4 determines the default productivity threshold ωit that characterizes the debt
contract. Equation 5, in turn, determines the ﬁrm’s leverage ratio
Bit−1
Nit−1. Together,
the optimal debt contract generates a schedule relating the ﬁrm’s leverage ratio to
the external ﬁnance premium,
Rk
t
Rt. Because the external ﬁnance premium is unobserv-
able, we can use the equation 1—which deﬁnes the contractual rate Rb
it—to obtain a
relationship linking the observable credit spread for ﬁrm i,
Rb
it
Rt , to the ﬁrm’s leverage
Bit−1

















It is worth noting that even in the frictionless case, in which µ =0a n dRk
t/Rt =1 ,
equation 6 implies a positive spread between the contractual rate Rb
it and the risk-free
rate Rt. This spread exists to compensate the lender for the fact that a certain fraction
of ﬁrms will inevitably default on their debt obligations, and the equilibrium stipulates
that the lender earns the risk-free rate of return. In the presence of bankruptcy
costs, credit spreads also include an external ﬁnance premium component. However,
movements in the external ﬁnance premium do not lead to one-to-one movements
in the credit spread, because when µ>0, the ﬁrst-order conditions 4 and 5 imply
endogenous changes in the default productivity threshold and leverage.
2.2 Comparative Statics
To gain a better insight into how various model-implied relationships vary with
changes in the key structural parameters—namely the degree of ﬁnancial frictions
µ and the variance of the idiosyncratic productivity shock σ2—we turn to compar-
ative statics. Following BGG, we assume that the productivity disturbance ωit is
























where Φ(·) denotes the standard normal cumulative distribution function.
Figure 2 considers the implications of varying the magnitude of ﬁnancial market
frictions (µ =0 ,0.12,0.24,0.36), assuming a constant standard deviation of idiosyn-
cratic productivity shocks (σ =0 .28).7 As seen in the top left panel, the default
productivity threshold ω is relatively invariant with respect to µ over a consider-
able range of leverage. It is only for highly leveraged borrowers that increases in
bankruptcy costs generate signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the default threshold. In this
case, an increase in µ causes a decrease in ω, because the optimal contract between
the lender and the entrepreneur stipulates a lower default threshold in order to reduce
the incidence of increasingly costly default. Despite the lower probability of default
(top right panel), the external ﬁnance premium schedule (bottom left panel) steepens
considerably, and the lender demands a wider credit spread (bottom right panel):
Intuitively, a higher external ﬁnance premium and credit spread at a given leverage
reﬂect greater bankruptcy costs in the event of default.
Note that the default productivity threshold ω is at the highest level (for any
leverage) when µ = 0. The frictionless case generates the highest and the steepest
default probability schedule, but because there is no dead-weight loss associated with
bankruptcy, the external ﬁnance premium is zero. The positive relationship between
leverage and credit spreads when µ = 0 reﬂects solely a higher probability of default
that comes with greater leverage, an implication, in turn, of an upward-sloping ω–
leverage schedule.
The eﬀects of changes in the volatility of idiosyncratic risk (σ =0 .14,0.28,0.42)
7The calibration used by BGG corresponds to µ =0 .12 and σ =0 .28. When calculating the
annualized external ﬁnance premium and the annualized credit spread, we set the risk-free rate equal
to three percent.
8Figure 2














































          Note. Standard deviation of the idiosyncratic productivity shock (σ ) is set equal to 0.28. The external 
          finance premium and the credit spread are measured relative to a risk−free rate of 3 percent.
9while holding bankruptcy costs constant (µ =0 .12) are shown in Figure 3. As σ
increases and riskier investment projects are being ﬁnanced, the ω–leverage schedule
shifts up (top left panel). Although increases in the default threshold are very small
for most reasonable values of leverage, they translate, for a given leverage, into a
considerably higher likelihood of default (top right panel). The resulting jump in ex-
pected bankruptcies accordingly causes a signiﬁcant upward shift in both the external
ﬁnance premium and the credit spread schedules over a much wider range of leverage
(bottom panels).
The size of the bankruptcy parameter µ,a sw e l la st h a to fσ,i sa no p e ne m p i r -
ical question. Moreover, the potential variability of these two parameters over the
course of the business cycle has important implications for the behavior of the ex-
ternal ﬁnance premium, a key unobservable variable determining the magnitude of
the ﬁnancial accelerator. To shed light on these questions, we constructed a new
dataset linking ﬁrm-level balance sheet variables to credit spreads and market-based
measures of expected default risk, which allows us to estimate directly the volatility
of idiosyncratic risk and the magnitude of bankruptcy costs implied by the BGG
debt-contracting problem for the 1997–2003 period. Estimates of these structural
parameters, in turn, permit us to examine the behavior of the model-implied external
ﬁnance premium during the most recent economic downturn.
10Figure 3

















































          Note. Bankruptcy cost parameter (µ  ) is set equal to 0.12. The external finance premium and the credit
          spread are measured relative to a risk−free rate of 3 percent.
113 Data Description
Our dataset is an unbalanced quarterly panel for 918 publicly-traded Compustat ﬁrms
in the U.S. nonfarm nonﬁnancial corporate sector from 1997Q1 to 2003Q3 (27 quar-
ters).8 The distinguishing feature of ﬁrms in our sample is that a signiﬁcant part of
their long-term debt is in form of bonds that are actively traded in the secondary
market. For these ﬁrms, we have linked market prices of their outstanding securities
and market-based measures of default risks to Compustat’s balance sheet statements.
We now turn to the construction of our key variables: leverage, credit spreads, and
expected probabilities of default.
3.1 Sources and Methods
Leverage. Our measure of the ﬁrm’s leverage is constructed using Compustat balance
sheet information. Leverage is deﬁned as the ratio of the book value of long-term debt
(all debt obligations due in more than one year from the ﬁrm’s balance sheet at the
end of the quarter) to the market-value of common equity.9 We use the book value
of debt, as opposed to the market value, because the book value is the amount that
the ﬁrm must repay. Market capitalization is computed by multiplying the number
of common shares outstanding by the closing stock price, both measured at the end
of the quarter.
Credit spreads. Daily market prices of corporate bonds were obtained from the Mer-
rill Lynch database that includes prices of dollar-denominated corporate bonds pub-
licly issued in the U.S. bond market.10 Qualifying securities must have at least one
year remaining term-to-maturity, a ﬁxed coupon schedule, and a minimum amount
outstanding of $100 million for below investment-grade and $150 million for investment-
grade issuers.
To calculate an overall credit spread on the ﬁrm’s outstanding bonds, we matched
the daily eﬀective yield on each individual security issued by the ﬁrm to the esti-
mated yield on the Treasury coupon security of the same maturity. Treasury yields
8The membership in our panel is limited to ﬁrms that reported at least 4 consecutive quarters of
income and balance sheet data.
9We restrict the numerator of the leverage ratio to long-term debt because our secondary-market
prices pertain to long-term corporate securities. In addition, ﬁrms often maintain a stock of liquid
assets to cover their short-term liabilities.
10The Merrill Lynch individual security prices are available starting in 1997.
12were taken from a smoothed yield curve estimated on a large sample of oﬀ-the-run
Treasury coupon securities using the technique proposed by Svensson (1994).11 The
resulting spread between corporate and Treasury securities, however, is distorted by
the diﬀerential tax treatment of corporate and government debt—corporate bond
coupons are subject to taxes at the state level whereas Treasury coupons are not.
Because investors compare returns across instruments on an after-tax basis, yields on
corporate bonds will be systematically higher than yields on government securities
to compensate for the payment of state taxes. Indeed, Elton et al. (2001) estimate
that, on average, these tax factors can account for as much as 20 percent of corporate
credit spreads.
We used the method proposed by Cooper and Davydenko (2002) to estimate the
distortionary eﬀect of the state-level taxation on corporate bond spreads. According
to Elton et al. (2001), the relevant tax rate for the tax-adjusted spread between
corporate and government securities is given by τ = ts(1 − tg), where ts and tg are
the state and the federal tax rates, respectively. As suggested, we set τ equal to












where tM is the corporate security’s maturity and rtM is the corresponding Treasury
coupon yield (see Cooper and Davydenko (2002) for further details). To calculate an
overall ﬁrm-speciﬁc credit spread, we averaged the tax-adjusted spreads on the ﬁrm’s
outstanding bonds, using the product of market values of bonds and their eﬀective
durations as weights.12 We matched the ﬁrm-speciﬁc daily spreads to quarterly bal-
ance sheet information by averaging the daily spreads over the ﬁrst month of the
quarter.13
11On-the-run securities were excluded from the sample because yields on those securities are
strongly inﬂuenced by liquidity premiums, which can aﬀect the shape of the estimated yield curve
and, moreover, can shift the curve around the auction cycle.
12The use of the dollar duration of bonds as a weight in computing the yield on a portfolio of
bonds represents a ﬁrst-order Taylor series approximation to the portfolio yield; see Choi and Park
(2002) for details. Our results were virtually identical when portfolio spreads were averaged using
market values of bonds as weights only.
13That is, credit spreads matched to any ﬁrst quarter of balance sheet data are averages of the daily
spreads in January, spreads during the second quarter are averages of the daily spreads during April,
and so on. We also converted daily spreads to a quarterly frequency by averaging over the entire
quarter. All of the results reported in this paper were robust to this alternative timing assumption.
13Default probabilities. Our measure of the probability that a ﬁrm in our sample will
default within a certain period of time comes from the Moody’s|K·M·V Corporation
(MKMV). The theoretical underpinnings to these probabilities of default are provided
by the seminal work of Merton (1973, 1974). According to this option-theoretic
approach, the probability that a ﬁrm will default on its debt obligations at any point
in the future is determined by three major factors: the market value of the ﬁrm’s
assets, the standard deviation of the stochastic process for the market value of assets
(i.e., asset volatility), and the ﬁrm’s leverage. These three factors are combined into
























In theory, the default point should equal to the book value of total liabilities,
implying that the distance to default compares the net worth of the ﬁrm with the
size of a one-standard-deviation move in the ﬁrm’s asset value.14 The market value
of assets and the volatility of assets, however, are not directly observable, so they
have to be computed in order to calculate the distance to default. Assuming that the
ﬁrm’s assets are traded, the market value of the ﬁrm’s equity can be viewed as a call
option on the ﬁrm’s assets with the strike price equal to the current book value of
the ﬁrm’s total debt.15 Using this insight, MKMV “backs out” the market value and
the volatility of assets from a proprietary variant of the Black-Scholes-Merton option
pricing model, employing the observed book value of liabilities and the market value
of equity as inputs; see Crosbie and Bohn (2003) for details.
In the ﬁnal step, MKMV transforms the distance to default into an expected
probability of default—the so-called expected default frequency (EDF)—using an
empirical distribution of actual defaults. Speciﬁcally, MKMV estimates a mapping
relating the likelihood of default over a particular horizon to various levels of distance
to default, employing an extensive proprietary database of historical defaults and
14Empirically, however, MKMV has found that most defaults occur when the market value of
the ﬁrm’s assets drops to the value equal to the sum of the ﬁrm’s current liabilities and one-half of
long-term liabilities (i.e., Default Point = Current Liabilities+0.5×Long-Term Liabilities), and the
default point is calibrated accordingly.
15The assumption that all of the ﬁrm’s assets are traded is clearly inappropriate in most cases.
Nevertheless, as shown by Ericsson and Reneby (1999), this approach is still valid provided that at
least one of the ﬁrm’s securities (e.g., equity) is traded.
14bankruptcies in the United States.16 In our case, these EDFs are calculated monthly
and measure the probability that a ﬁrm will default on its debt obligations over the
next 12 months. We used EDFs as of the last month of the quarter when merging
MKMV data to the quarterly Compustat balance sheet variables.
It should be noted that MKMV does not disclose how the mapping between the
distance to default and the EDF is computed. However, these timely, forward-looking
measures of default risk are widely used by ﬁnancial market participants when assess-
ing credit risk. One clear advantage of EDFs over the traditional measures of default
risk based, for example, on credit ratings stems from the fact that the dynamics of
EDFs are driven primarily by the movements in equity values. As a result, EDF-
based measures of credit risk have the ability to react more rapidly to deterioration
in the ﬁrm’s credit quality as well as to reﬂect more promptly changes in aggregate
economic conditions.
3.2 Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 contains several summary statistics for our panel. Despite our focus on
ﬁrms that have both equity and a portion of their debt traded in open markets, ﬁrm
size—measured by sales or market capitalization—varies widely in our sample. Not
surprisingly, though, most of the ﬁrms in our dataset are quite large. The median
ﬁrm has more than $670 million in sales and a market capitalization of about $2.1
billion. About one-half of observations are associated with leverage ratios greater
than one. The relatively high leverage in our sample is due in part to the steep fall
in equity prices that started in the spring of 2000, which signiﬁcantly reduced the
market capitalization of ﬁrms, thereby driving up their leverage ratios.
16The MKMV’s mapping of distances to default to EDFs restricts the probability estimates to the
range between 0.02 percent and 20 percent because of sparse data beyond these points.
15Table 1
Summary Statistics
Variable Minimum Median Maximum
Sales ($ billions) 0.002 0.7 57
Mkt. Capitalization ($ billions) 0.006 2.2 309
Leverage Ratioa 0.02 0.50 15.9
Credit Spreadb (p.p.) 0.27 2.27 29.14
No. of Issues Traded 1 2 59
Avg. Portfolio Maturity (years) 1 8 30
Share of Traded Debtc (%) 2 51 100
S&P Credit Rating C2 BBB3 AAA
Year-Ahead EDF (%) 0.02 0.55 19.9
Panel Dimensions
Observations = 14,124 Firms = 918
Min. Tenure = 4 Median Tenure = 14 Max. Tenure = 27
Notes: Sample period: 1997Q1–2003Q3. In every period, the sample excludes ﬁrms
with leverage ratios below the 2.5
th percentile and above the 97.5
th percentile, ﬁrms with
credit spreads above the 97.5
th percentile, and ﬁrms with EDFs at exactly 20%. Sales
and market capitalization are in real chain-weighted dollars.
aThe book value of long-term debt relative to market capitalization.
bAdjusted for the diﬀerential tax treatment of corporate and Treasury securities.
cThe book value of traded bonds relative to the book value of total long-term debt.
Although ﬁrms in our sample generally have only a few bond issues trading at any
given point in time, this publicly-traded debt represents a signiﬁcant portion of their
long-term debt. The median ratio of the book value of traded bonds outstanding
to the book value of total long-term debt on ﬁrms’ balance sheet is about one-half,
suggesting that market prices on outstanding securities likely provide an accurate
gauge of the marginal cost of external ﬁnance for most of the ﬁrms. Our sample also
spans essentially the entire corporate credit quality spectrum—from C2, the “junkiest
junk,” to AAA, the highest grade. In terms of credit quality, the median observation
is at the bottom rung of the investment-grade ladder, and it is associated with a tax-
adjusted spread of 227 basis points over the risk-free rate and an expected year-ahead
default frequency of 55 basis points.
Our sample includes only 918 nonﬁnancial corporations. Nonetheless, it is repre-
sentative of the aggregate economy along a number of dimensions. The upper panel
of Figure 4 compares the aggregate growth rate of real sales for the ﬁrms in our panel
16Figure 4
Aggregate Corporate Balance Sheets











Note. Firm−level sales were deflated by the chain−weighted GDP price deflator (2000=100).
Data are seasonally adjusted.
¹ All nonfinancial corporations.












Note. Data are seasonally adjusted.
¹ Median book value of long−term debt relative to market value of equity weighted by firm sales.
² Book value of bonds and mortgages relative to market value of equity for all nonfinancial
corporations.
17with the corresponding growth rate for the Compustat’s entire nonfarm nonﬁnancial
sector. The two series are highly correlated and exhibit virtually identical business
cycle dynamics. The lower panel compares the sales-weighted median leverage of ﬁrms
in our sample with the corresponding statistic for all nonﬁnancial ﬁrms in Compustat
as well as with a measure of long-term leverage in the nonﬁnancial sector obtained
from the Flow of Funds accounts.17 The three measures paint a very similar picture
of the state of corporate balance sheets over time. Clearly evident is the sharp run-up
in corporate leverage during the late 1980s, followed by a steady decline over most
of the past decade. Leverage in the nonﬁnancial corporate sector bottomed out at
a very low level in the late 1990s and then rose noticeably after the bursting of the
stock market bubble in the spring of 2000.
Credit spreads in our sample are also representative of the spreads in the corporate
bond market as a whole, when controlling for the maturity of bonds outstanding and
the credit quality of issuers. As shown in the upper panel of Figure 5, the (weighted)
median credit spread for BBB-rated debt with maturity of 7 to 10 years obtained
from our sample provides a very close match to the (weighted) median spread of
all nonﬁnancial bond issues in the Merrill lynch database. (This result holds for
other rating categories and maturity buckets.) Finally, the lower panel shows that
the evolution of the (weighted) median expected one-year-ahead default frequency
for the ﬁrms in our sample tracks very closely the (weighted) median EDF of all
nonﬁnancial ﬁrms in the MKMV database.
For our purposes, the two key relationships implied by the BGG framework are
the leverage-spread and the leverage-default-probability schedules. These two un-
conditional relationships are plotted in Figure 6 using the ﬁrm-level data.18 Despite
enormous variation, there is a clearly discernable pattern between leverage and credit
spreads (top panel) and leverage and expected probabilities of default (bottom panel).
Moreover, the contours of these relationships are broadly similar to those implied by
the BGG model in Figures 2–3, in that a higher leverage is associated with a wider
credit spread and a higher expected probability of defaults.
17The sales-weighted median leverage in period t identiﬁes a ﬁrm in the distribution of leverage
such that ﬁrms with higher (or lower) leverage in period t account for one-half of sample liabilities.
18To minimize the visual eﬀect of outliers, we drop in each quarter ﬁrms with leverage ratios
above the 97.5
th percentile and below the 97.5
th percentile, ﬁrms with credit spreads above the
97.5
th percentile, and ﬁrms with EDFs at exactly 20%.
18Figure 5
Aggregate Corporate Credit Spreads and Credit Quality








Note. Medians are weighted by the market value of bonds outstanding. Merrill Lynch data are
for nonfinancial issues only.
Our Dataset
Merrill Lynch
Median BBB 7−10 Years Credit Spread
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As discussed in Section 2, the bankruptcy cost parameter µ determines the magnitude
of ﬁnancial market frictions in the BGG framework. Recognizing that this parameter
may exhibit substantial temporal variation, we use the cross-section of ﬁrm-level
observations for each time period t, and apply non-linear least squares (NLLS) to
obtain the value of µt that minimizes the sum of squared deviations between observed
credit spreads and those predicted by the model. In implementing this procedure,
we allow the idiosyncratic shock variance, σit, to vary across ﬁrms as well as time
periods.
For any given value of the bankruptcy cost parameter, the predicted credit spread
of a given ﬁrm i at time period t is computed as follows. First, using the observed
leverage ratio and expected default probability, the following two equations can be


















where [B/N]i,t−1 denotes the ﬁrm’s leverage at the end of the previous quarter, and
EDFi,t−1|t denotes the probability (as of the end of quarter t − 1) that ﬁrm i will
default in quarter t. Under the assumption of log-normality of the idiosyncratic
shocks, the functions ψ and ξ are given by equations 7 and 8, respectively, while Φ
denotes the standard normal cumulative distribution function.19
Next, the predicted credit spread [Rbit/Rit]∗ is obtained by evaluating the follow-
ing expression using these values of ω∗
it and σ∗































19To match the one-period nature of the BGG framework, we convert the MKMV year-ahead
expected default frequency (EDFit|t+1...t+4) to a quarterly basis using the simplifying assumption of
a constant hazard rate over each four-quarter horizon; that is, EDFit|t+1 =( 1 + E D F it|t+1...t+4)1/4−1.
21Since the BGG model abstracts from various details of ﬁnancial market behavior,












=R A T I N G it−1 + INDUSTRYit +  it (12)
where RATINGit−1 denotes the set of dummies associated with bond portfolio credit
ratings at the end of period t − 1, and INDUSTRYit denotes the set of industry
dummies; the coeﬃcients on these dummies are allowed to vary over time.20 The
stochastic disturbance  it is assumed to have zero mean and to be independent across
ﬁrms, but may exhibit time-varying heteroskedasticity; that is, E[ it]=0 ,E [  2
it]=ν2
it,
and E[ it jt] = 0, for all i  = j.
The rating dummies are included to control for liquidity factors that arise from the
fact that certain corporate bonds trade rather infrequently, implying a relatively thin
secondary markets for some securities.21 In such a case, a credit spread will include
a premium to compensate investors for the risk of having to sell or hedge a position
in an illiquid market. As shown by Delianedis and Geske (2001), this liquidity risk is
correlated with default risk and accounts for a signiﬁcant portion of observed credit
spreads. Controlling for industry diﬀerences is potentially important because our
dataset, though rich in the cross-sectional dimension, spans a single business cycle
dominated by the bursting of the high-tech bubble.
Following this approach, the residual vector ( 1t,...  ntt) can be computed for any
given value of µ. Thus, for each time period, we start with an initial guess for this
parameter, and then utilize a standard optimization algorithm to obtain the NLLS
estimator ˆ µt that minimizes the sum of squared residuals.22
20Credit rating indicators are based on the average of the S&P ratings of the ﬁrm’s outstanding
bond issues, weighted by the market value of bonds. The resulting portfolio credit ratings were
condensed into nine categories: AAA, AA, A, BBB, BB, B, CCC, CC, and C. Industry eﬀects are
based on the 3-digit North American Industry Classiﬁcation System (NAICS).
21See Warga (1991) for a discussion of problems associated with high-frequency corporate bond
prices and the use of “grid-based” pricing.
22For each time period, we utilized an extensive grid of initial guesses to ensure that the NLLS
estimator reached the global minimum of the objective function.
225 Empirical Results
5.1 Benchmark Estimates of Financial Market Frictions
Figure 7 shows the evolution of the estimated bankruptcy cost parameter µ over our
sample period. From early 1997 to the end of 1999, the point estimate of µ appears
to be quite stable, hovering in the range between 0.08 and 0.16. One clear exception
during this period is the substantially larger estimate for 1998Q4. This jump in
estimated bankruptcy costs reﬂects the turbulence in ﬁnancial markets following the
Russian default and the LTCM crisis in the late summer of that year. Smoothing
through the 1998Q4 spike, the average estimate of µ during this period is remarkably
close to 0.12, the value chosen by BGG in the steady-state calibration of their model.
Our estimates are also within the range of bankruptcy costs estimated by Altman
(1984) for a sample of industrial ﬁrms that declared bankruptcy in the mid-1970s.23
The bursting of the stock market bubble in the spring of 2000 signiﬁcantly de-
pressed equity valuations, causing an increase in corporate leverage. By the onset of
the last NBER-dated recession in March 2001, credit spreads also had widened sig-
niﬁcantly. In the context of the BGG model, however, the rise in leverage apparently
was insuﬃcient to account fully for the runup in credit spreads. A part of the increase
in credit spreads during this period reﬂected an increase in the external ﬁnance pre-
mium, as our estimates of ω∗
it only rose slightly (see equation 6).24 The increase in
the external ﬁnance premium also did not come about from higher σ∗
it’s, the point to
which we return later. Instead, it stemmed from an increase in bankruptcy costs, as
evidenced by our estimates of µ, which more than doubled over this period.
After declining moderately over the course of the 2001 downturn and into early
2002, the estimated µ rose sharply in the latter half of the year. This increase likely
reﬂected a further plunge in share prices and the balooning of credit spreads, as
the post-Enron wave of corporate governance scandals and heightened geopolitical
tensions that preceeded the invasion of Iraq rattled investors’ conﬁdence. For this
period as a whole, our estimates of bankruptcy costs are much closer to the average
23Altman’s (1984) estimates of bankruptcy costs include both the direct and indirect costs and
average between 11 percent and 17 percent of the value of the ﬁrm. Direct costs—explicit admin-
istrative costs paid by the debtor during the reorganization/liquidation process—were taken from
the bankruptcy records of individual ﬁrms. Measures of indirect costs, namely lost proﬁts, were
estimated.
24For example, the sales-weighed median ω∗
it rose from 0.218 to 0.236 in 2000.
23Figure 7




















NLLS Estimates of Bankruptcy Cost Parameter µ  
Note. The shaded region represents +/− two standard error bands computed using a
heteroscedasticity−consistent asymptotic covariance matrix.
liquidation costs calculated by Alderson and Betker (1995) for a sample of ﬁrms that
completed Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings between 1982 and 1993. In 2003, as
the economy recovered, stock prices started to rise, and credit spreads narrowed, the
point estimate of µ declined back to the range that prevailed at the beginning of our
sample period.
According to standard errors in Table 2, estimates of µ are not statistically dif-
ferent from zero at conventional signiﬁcance levels in just two periods (1998Q1 and
1999Q3). In all other periods, we overwhelmingly reject the null hypothesis of no
ﬁnancial market frictions. The benchmark speciﬁcation also ﬁts the data remark-
ably well, explaining as much as 88 percent of the cross-sectional variance in credit
spreads during our sample period. Likelihood ratio tests strongly reject the exclusion
of credit rating eﬀects throughout the sample period, while industry eﬀects are statis-
tically signiﬁcant only in the aftermath of the Russian default in late 1998 and from
the end of 2000 forth. These results suggest that factors other than bankruptcy costs
and expected probabilities of default play an important role in determining spreads
on corporate bonds, especially during periods of heightened volatility in ﬁnancial
markets.
24Table 2
NLLS Estimates of Bankruptcy Cost Parameter µ
Period Obs. Estimate Std. Err.a Adj. R2 Pr >λ R
b Pr >λ I
c
1997Q2 327 0.131 0.037 0.88 <. 01 0.29
1997Q3 349 0.105 0.022 0.88 <. 01 0.15
1997Q4 368 0.139 0.035 0.88 <. 01 0.57
1998Q1 392 0.080 0.047 0.87 <. 01 0.68
1998Q2 399 0.074 0.028 0.83 <. 01 0.72
1998Q3 427 0.074 0.034 0.84 <. 01 0.39
1998Q4 442 0.228 0.044 0.85 <. 01 <. 01
1999Q1 458 0.145 0.037 0.81 <. 01 <. 01
1999Q2 460 0.112 0.031 0.77 <. 01 0.05
1999Q3 438 0.088 0.047 0.72 <. 01 0.29
1999Q4 442 0.165 0.043 0.69 <. 01 0.16
2000Q1 463 0.188 0.056 0.69 <. 01 0.53
2000Q2 476 0.273 0.055 0.71 <. 01 0.59
2000Q3 487 0.253 0.039 0.70 <. 01 0.12
2000Q4 492 0.458 0.069 0.65 <. 01 <. 01
2001Q1 490 0.406 0.069 0.62 <. 01 <. 01
2001Q2 500 0.463 0.079 0.70 <. 01 <. 01
2001Q3 489 0.386 0.075 0.73 <. 01 <. 01
2001Q4 480 0.372 0.070 0.74 <. 01 <. 01
2002Q1 497 0.291 0.062 0.76 <. 01 <. 01
2002Q2 508 0.292 0.062 0.75 <. 01 <. 01
2002Q3 502 0.359 0.064 0.76 <. 01 <. 01
2002Q4 523 0.444 0.052 0.73 <. 01 <. 01
2003Q1 537 0.330 0.039 0.77 <. 01 <. 01
2003Q2 523 0.164 0.029 0.77 <. 01 <. 01
2003Q3 520 0.186 0.041 0.77 <. 01 <. 01
Notes: In every period, the sample excludes ﬁrms with leverage ratios below the
2.5
th percentile and above the 97.5
th percentile, ﬁrms with credit spreads above the
97.5
th percentile, and ﬁrms with EDFs at exactly 20%.
aComputed using a heteroscedasticity-consistent asymptotic covariance matrix; see White
(1980).
bp-value for the likelihood ratio test statistic λR of the exclusion of ﬁxed credit rating
eﬀects.
cp-value for the likelihood ratio test statistic λI of the exclusion of ﬁxed industry eﬀects.
25Using our estimates of the bankruptcy cost parameter µt and the corresponding
solutions for the default productivity threshold ω∗
it and the standard deviation of
the idiosyncratic productivity shock σ∗
it, we can calculate the model-implied recovery
rate. This provides an alternative metric by which to evaluate the BGG model and the
quantitative relevance of bankruptcy costs during the last economic downturn. Figure
8 shows the evolution over our sample period of both the average actual recovery rate
at default and the average model-implied recovery rate, deﬁned as
(1 − ˆ µt)Rk
t(Bit−1 + Nit−1)
Bit−1
× E [ωit | ωit < ω
∗
it], (13)
where E [ωit | ωit < ω∗
it] is the expected realization of the productivity disturbance ωit
conditional on being on default.25 The model-implied recovery rate is much higher
than the actual recovery rate on corporate bonds, particularly so in the pre-recession
period. As shown in the next subsection, the exclusion of credit rating eﬀects gen-
erates bigger estimates of the bankruptcy parameter µt and, consequently, smaller
model-implied recovery rates. Qualitatively, however, actual and model-implied re-
covery rates behave similarly even in this benchmark case, decreasing before the
economic downturn and rising since 2001. Importantly, the model-implied recovery
rate in the case without bankruptcy costs (µ = 0) is unrealistically high and displays
no cyclical pattern. This implies that a substantial degree of ﬁnancial market frictions
is a necessary ingredient if one wish to explain the recovery rate on corporate bonds
during the last recession.
An important advantage of our strategy of estimating a structural model is that
we can derive ﬁrm-speciﬁc estimates of the unobservable external ﬁnance premium.
Movements in the external ﬁnance premium over the business cycle reveal how endoge-
nous developments in ﬁnancial markets work to amplify and propagate shocks to the
economy. In fact, with procyclical borrowers’ net worth—due to the procyclicality
of proﬁts and equity valuations—the external ﬁnance premium will move counter-
25Assuming ωit is log normally distributed, we can write this conditional expectation as




























by the gross risk-free
rate Rt, which is assumed to be constant at an annual rate of 3 percent.
26Figure 8












Recovery Rates on Defaulted Bonds
¹ Average model−implied recovery rate with   µ = 0, weighted by the book value of bonds outstanding.
² Average model−implied recovery rate with estimated µ , weighted by the book value of bonds
outstanding.
³ Average recovery rate at default weighted by the book value of the defaulted bond issue
(four−quarter moving average).
cyclically, amplifying the swings in borrowing and, consequently, in investment and
output.
Figure 9 shows the cyclical behavior of the model-implied external ﬁnance pre-
mium calculated using the solutions for ω∗
it and σ∗
it and our estimates of the bankruptcy
cost parameter µt. Smoothing through the Russian default in late 1998, the model-
implied external ﬁnance premium was close to zero across the entire cross-section of
ﬁrms until the end of 1999. As stock prices began to slide in early 2000, causing a
decline in ﬁrms’ net worth (i.e., market capitalization) and an increase in corporate
leverage, the external ﬁnance premium rose sharply, and the increase is economically
signiﬁcant. Firms that account for a half of aggregate sample sales experienced an
increase in the external ﬁnance premium of at least 150 basis points, while ﬁrms that
account for one quarter of aggregate sample sales faced an increase in the external ﬁ-
nance premium of more than 300 basis points. The external ﬁnance premium started
to decline at the end of the NBER-date recession but then jumped up again at the
end of 2002 in response to concerns about corporate governance.
To investigate the interaction between the cyclical behavior of our estimates of
µ and the dynamics of the external ﬁnance premium over the latest business cycle,
27Figure 9
Model−Implied External Finance Premium








       
       
75th Percentile
Time−varying   µ   Counterfactual (µ  = 0.12)


















                      Note. Percentiles are weighted by real sales. The counterfactual excercise with a
                      constant µ  = 0.12 uses the firm−specific variance and productivity threshold obtained
                      from estimating a time−varying   µ  .
28we consider a counterfactual scenario with a time-invariant µ set equal 0.12, the
benchmark calibration of BGG. We then use model-implied σ∗
it and ω∗
it computed at
the time-varying NLLS estimate of µ. As shown in Figure 9, time variations in ˆ µt are
necessary to generate economically signiﬁcant swings in the model-implied external
ﬁnance premium. The counterfactual scenario, in fact, implies very small movements
in the external ﬁnance premium over the entire cross-section of ﬁrms. Such small
movements are diﬃcult to reconcile with the sharp drop in capital spending during
the latest economic downturn, unless one is willing to assume a very large elasticity
of investment with respect to the external ﬁnance premium.
Nevertheless, one might argue that the sharp increase in the external ﬁnance
premium during the latest recession stemmed instead from an increase in the idiosyn-
cratic risk. In fact, according to Figure 2 and 3, a bigger external ﬁnance premium can
be associated with both a bigger bankruptcy cost parameter µ and higher volatility
of the idiosyncratic risk σ. As shown in Figure 10, however, the runup in the ex-
ternal ﬁnance premium cannot be attributed to a large increase in the idiosyncratic
risk. The model-implied volatility parameter σ for the sales-weighted median ﬁrm is
fairly constant over the business cycle, despite a noticeable increase in the expected
default probability.26 The relatively stable σ appers to conﬁrm our account of the lat-
est economic downturn, according to which to explain the large movements in credit
spreads and the external ﬁnance premium, you do need substantial time variation in
the bankruptcy cost parameter µ.
26In terms of Figure 2 and 3, the intuition is as follows. Small changes in the volatility of idiosyn-
cratic risk cause large and unlikely variations in credit spread and external ﬁnance premium. On
the contrary, signiﬁcant changes in the bankruptcy parameter imply relatively smaller variations in
credit spread and external ﬁnance premium.
29Figure 10
Idiosyncratic Risk and Probability of Default










Median Model−Implied   σ
Note. Medians are weighted by real sales.











5.2 Excluding Credit Rating Eﬀects
The main reason for including credit ratings in our credit spread equation 12 is
that they represent a reasonable proxy for liquidity factors. As already mentioned,
corporate bonds can include a liquidity premium due to the fact that markets are
at times relatively thin and illiquid. To analyze whether liquidity factors are indeed
a signiﬁcant component of observed credit spreads and to shed some light on their
interaction with ﬁnancial market frictions, we reestimate the time-varying bankruptcy
parameter µ without including credit rating eﬀects.
As shown in the upper panel of Figure 11, excluding credit ratings generates a
signiﬁcantly larger estimates of the bankruptcy parameter µt, though the time-series
pattern remains the same.27 According to Table 3, the ﬁt of the model with industry
eﬀects alone is about half as good as the benchmark speciﬁcation that includes both
ﬁxed credit rating and industry eﬀects. This suggests that credit ratings might be
picking up an important component of the residual spread in equation 12, which
27Although industry eﬀects are statistically signiﬁcant in the benchmark speciﬁcation—at least
during the latter half of our sample period—their exclusion has a negligible eﬀect on the estimates
of µ.
30Figure 11
Estimates Without Credit Rating Effects
















NLLS Estimates of the Bankruptcy Cost Parameter µ  
Note. The shaded region represents +/− two standard error bands computed using a
heteroscedasticity−consistent asymptotic covariance matrix. The model includes fixed industry
(3−digit NAICS) effects.
¹ See Figure 6.
Baseline Estimate¹








¹ Average model−implied recovery rate weighted by the book value of bonds outstanding.
² Average recovery rate at default weighted by the book value of the defaulted bond issue
(four−quarter moving average).




Recovery Rates on Defaulted Bonds
31Table 3
NLLS Estimates of Bankruptcy Cost Parameter µ
Period Obs. Estimate Std. Err.a Adj. R2 Pr >λ I
b
1997Q2 327 0.144 0.041 0.45 <. 01
1997Q3 349 0.105 0.029 0.41 <. 01
1997Q4 368 0.139 0.040 0.47 <. 01
1998Q1 392 0.080 0.051 0.40 <. 01
1998Q2 399 0.074 0.030 0.36 <. 01
1998Q3 427 0.074 0.032 0.38 <. 01
1998Q4 442 0.239 0.046 0.49 <. 01
1999Q1 458 0.163 0.038 0.48 <. 01
1999Q2 460 0.121 0.031 0.49 <. 01
1999Q3 438 0.106 0.044 0.42 <. 01
1999Q4 442 0.178 0.048 0.49 <. 01
2000Q1 463 0.193 0.052 0.52 <. 01
2000Q2 476 0.275 0.050 0.56 <. 01
2000Q3 487 0.262 0.038 0.59 <. 01
2000Q4 492 0.496 0.063 0.58 <. 01
2001Q1 490 0.472 0.064 0.52 <. 01
2001Q2 500 0.485 0.077 0.60 <. 01
2001Q3 489 0.400 0.078 0.58 <. 01
2001Q4 480 0.401 0.079 0.53 <. 01
2002Q1 497 0.291 0.058 0.52 <. 01
2002Q2 508 0.290 0.062 0.53 <. 01
2002Q3 502 0.349 0.062 0.54 <. 01
2002Q4 523 0.443 0.055 0.54 <. 01
2003Q1 537 0.342 0.040 0.54 <. 01
2003Q2 523 0.186 0.029 0.47 <. 01
2003Q3 520 0.203 0.043 0.46 <. 01
Notes: In every period, the sample excludes ﬁrms with leverage ratios below
the 2.5
th percentile and above the 97.5
th percentile, ﬁrms with credit spreads above
the 97.5
th percentile, and ﬁrms with EDFs at exactly 20%.
aComputed using a heteroscedasticity-consistent asymptotic covariance matrix;
see White (1980).
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cannot be explained by the expected default probabilities derived from the option-
theoretic framework underlying the MKMV approach. Thus, once credit rating eﬀects






would incorporate diﬀerent sorts of
ﬁnancial market frictions—bankruptcy costs and liquidity premiums—and would be
likely wider, requiring in turn a bigger ˆ µt.
The ﬁt of the model, under the speciﬁcation that excludes credit rating eﬀects, is
greatly improved if we use the model-implied recovery rate as an alternative metric
to evaluate the BGG framework. In fact, as shown in the lower panel of Figure 11,
the model-implied recovery rate is now much closer to the actual recovery rate on
defaulted bonds, particularly since early 2001.
5.3 Limitations of the BGG Framework
In addition to the time-varying bankruptcy cost parameter µt, the other (unobserv-
able) key parameter of the BGG model that we solve for is σit, the ﬁrm-speciﬁc,
time-varying standard deviation of the idiosyncratic productivity shock. As shown
in Figure 12, the model implies a strong prediction between ﬁrms’ leverage and the
33volatility of idiosyncratic risk. In particular, ﬁrms with higher leverage display a
smaller variance of their returns to capital.
This relationship between leverage and volatility of the idiosyncratic risk is some-
how counterintuitive, as ﬁrms with high leverage are generally thought to be riskier
than ﬁrms with low leverage. There appear to be two reasons for this result. The
ﬁrst reason has to do with the assumption that ωit is distributed log-normally. Al-
though useful to obtain easily tractable expressions for ψ(ωit;σ)a n dξ(ωit;σ,µ), this
assumption implies that the leverage-spread schedule is extremely steep. As a result,
the only way for the model to ﬁt the data is to assign a lower σit to a ﬁrm that
experienced an increase in its leverage.28
The second reason is the assumption of one-period debt in the BGG model, imply-
ing that the marginal and the average cost of external ﬁnance coincide in the model.
By contrast, credit spreads in our dataset, although they likely represent an accurate
measure of the marginal cost of external ﬁnance, are certainly a poor measure of the
average cost of external ﬁnance, as long-term bonds have a ﬁxed coupon payment
and in many cases were issued before the drop in stock prices.
28As shown in Figure 3, the leverage-spread schedule shifts to the right as σ gets smaller, implying
a smaller spread for given leverage.
346 Directions for Future Research
In future research we plan to extend our work in several directions. From an empirical
point of view, we plan to use our new ﬁrm-level dataset to investigate the degree of
non-linearity and the cyclical variations of the spread-leverage schedule. This relates
to the Bernanke and Campbell’s (1988) so-called “ﬁnancial fragility” argument, ac-
cording to which shocks to the economy have diﬀerent eﬀects on high- and low-debt
ﬁrms. Furthermore, we want to use our ﬁrm-level dataset to examine the link between
ﬁrm-speciﬁc credit spreads and investment expenditures.
From a theoretical point oif view, it would be interesting to consider the implica-
tions of greater heterogeneity across ﬁrms, with low-risk ﬁrms having a shallow slope
of the leverage-spread schedule and high-risk ﬁrms having a steeper schedule. We
would also like to extend the BGG framework to include some form of multi-period
debt contract 1to address the issue of the relationship between leverage and degree
of idiosyncratic risk outlined at the end of the previous section. Furthermore, we
plan to use perturbation methods to obtain second-order approximation of the model
around the steady state, characterize the optimal monetary policy, and compare the
welfare performance of alternative simple rules.
Finally, it would be interesting to extend our empirical analysis to the open econ-
omy framework, considering diﬀerent measures of leverage and spread for emerging
markets.
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